From the latter part of August until the move of the Division into the Haute Alsace Sector, every energy in the command was devoted to intensive training. The First American Army was winning its first laurels at Saint Mihiel and in the Argonne and every man of the 88^th Division was keyed to a high pitch in anticipation of an early opportunity to reach the front. All troops were billeted in small towns surrounding Semur and training was carried out in the recently cutover grain fields and on the unused pasture lands. The Division had hardly settled itself into the routine of real training, however, when orders came for a hurried move to the front. Directions for the move came in the form of field orders from Headquarters which read:

"Division will move by rail, beginning Sept. 14th, to relieve, in connection with a French Division, a Division now in the line. Battalions will be ready to move at two hours’ notice, and in readiness to relieve other units in the line upon arrival. Supply officers will requisition for two days’ reserve rations and two days’ travel rations per individual. "Personal equipment of officers in excess of bedding and clothing rolls will be shipped at once to railhead under guard of military police."

Lt. Col. Fay W. Brabson, General Staff, who had been an instructor at the Army General Staff College, joined the 88th Division in September, 1918, as Operations Officer.

Lt. Col. Bennett C. Clark, Infantry, and Maj. E. F. Wood, Infantry, graduates of the 3rd course at Army General Staff College, joined the Division at the same time as Assistant Chief of Staff G-1 and G-2, respectively.

On October 5th, when Col. Lincoln became sick, Col. Brabson took over the duties of Chief of Staff of the Division. He was promoted Colonel later and remained Chief of Staff of the Division until it was demobilized.

As stated in the warning order above, the original plan was for the 88th to relieve a division in the line. The division referred to was the 29th American Division, then serving its first tour in a quiet sector. However, besides a lack of transportation, the French Staff found the 88th with out gas masks or steel helmets and consequently wholly unprepared for duty in the trenches. Hence, instead of sending the 88th to relieve the 29th, the 38th French Division was sent to relieve the 29th. Later, the 88th Division was sent into sector for instruction by the 38th French Division and finally relieved that Division. Official records, General Headquarters, give the date of entry of the 88th Division into the line as October 12th. That was the date command of the front line of the sector passed to battalion commanders, 88th Division. On September 23d, two officers and one hundred men from each of the four Infantry Battalions that were scheduled first to take over the sector had moved by truck at night to the front. Medical and Intelligence Units soon followed, but it was not until October 12th that French front line battalions were wholly relieved by our advance Battalions. Preparations for the Division’s first actual tour of duty in the trenches were begun towards the close of September. Since landing in France, the entire command had been under a schedule of the most intensive sort of training. October first found the men in good physical condition, despite a very severe influenza epidemic. Specialists’ schools in every regiment and separate organization had added the finishing touches to individual training earlier acquired in the States and during the brief stop near Semur. At last the Division as a well-trained organization was prepared in every way to deliver a mighty blow.

SECRET

2. The relief will be carried out in accordance with the attached table. Completion of all moves and relief's will be reported promptly

3. (a) The 175th Infantry Brigade will hold the northern sub-sector, with 350th Infantry in the forward and the 349th Infantry in the rear zone. The 176th infantry Brigade will hold the southern sub-sector, with 351st Infantry in the forward zone and the 352nd Infantry in the rear zone.

  (c) Nil defense schemes, trench maps, aeroplane photographs and details of intelligence will be taken over.        The 38th Division defense scheme will remain in force pending issue of 88th Division defense scheme. All movement necessary for the reliefs will be carried out at night in such a way as to escape observation by the enemy. Detailed orders for field trains follow in administrative instructions.

5. (a) The C. 0. 350th Infantry, the C. 0. 351st Infantry and the Battalion Commanders of these regiments will take over command from the corresponding French Officer by whom they have been instructed on completion of relief. See F. 0. 7.

   (b) C. G. 175th Infantry Brigade will take over command northern sub— sector at Fontaine 15 October, 18 at 6 o’clock. See F.       0. 7. At same hour, C. G. 176th Infantry Brigade will take over command of southern sub-sector with headquarters at Montreux Jeune.

    (c) Command of the sector will pass to C. G. 88th Division, U. S. at 8 o'clock, 15 October, 18. See F. 0. 7.

     (d) Division P. C. at Montreux Chateau.(e) See F. 0. 7.

Off For The Front

Accordingly, Division Headquarters closed at Hericourt at 8 o’clock, October 7th and opened at Montreux Chateau at the same hour. Movement of the main bodies of troops was carried out at night and with great secrecy, for the enemy was maintaining close aerial observation of the entire sector at this time. For most of the organizations, the completion of the move required two nights of steady marching. Elements were formed at dusk and marched by parallel roads toward the front, strict march discipline and absolute silence being maintained throughout the moves.

It is well at this point to give a brief description of the general features of the sector as it was organized at the time it passed into the hands of the 88th Division. The entire front was approximately 19 kilometers long. No Man’s Land ranged in width from a kilometer at some places to less than 300 meters at others. During the early stages of the war, this territory had been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting, but for the last three and a half years, both sides had come to a standstill and stood facing each other, content to carry on a defensive war for the time being. The French Army had been committed politically to the relief of Alsace-Lorraine as a first step in case of war with Germany. Consequently, we find the general plans called for mobilization in the Belfort-Nancy region. Mulbouse was taken in an early offensive. It was only when France became convinced that Germany was making her principal drive through Belgium that the mobilization in the South was halted arid her troops shifted to the North to meet the Germans in Belgium. This depleted her strength to such an extent in the South that she was forced to evacuate Muihouse and fall back to the outer defense of the Gate of Belfort.

The general physical aspects of the terrain are much similar to those of the Middle West of the United States. It is a rolling country, with considerable wooded areas on both sides of the lines. Trenches in the north half of the sector lay mostly in the open, with small forests covering the lines of communication in rear. On the other hand, the front lines of the southern half traversed the Schonholz and Fulleren woods, giving excellent protection from enemy observation but presenting special danger in the case of sudden hostile bombardment and raids. Offensively the sector offered in the north a splendid terrain for the use of tanks which, launched from concealment in the numerous woods near the front line, could play havoc against the old wire systems and poorly kept up trenches opposite the northern sub-sector, and advancing with the infantry towards Mulhouse, could turn the high table land of Altkirch with comparative ease. Defensively, the sector was weak because of the heavily wooded salient of Bois de Carspach and Schonholz Woods, which prevented the placing of machine guns effectively without undue danger of capture by sudden hostile raids. The old Rhone-Rhine canal bisected the divisional area, traversed No Man’s Land and ran into the enemy lines at the towns of Eglingen and Enschingen. For a mile or more to the north and south of this canal, the terrain was low and marshy and partly covered with underbrush.

The 30th Bavarian Reserve Division was commanded by Lieut. Gen. Beeg with headquarters at Colmar. This Division had one regiment in line opposite our sector from the Rhone-Rhine canal to our northern boundary with two regiments at rest in the rear.

The first regiments to occupy the trenches with the French were the 350th and 351st Infantry regiments. Each placed two battalions in the front line and one in support. The other two infantry regiments, the 319th and 352d, were stationed in reserve immediately in rear.

French artillery in support. The reconnaissance party took shelter in old shell holes and dugouts. When the hostile barrage moved back, they were trapped by a German raiding party which followed its own barrage. The entire party were taken captive with the exception of one French Lieutenant, one machine gun officer and one 2(1 Lieutenant of the 2d Battalion, 350th Infantry.

"The working party in which Capt. Brethorst and several of his men were killed was near the entrance of Balschwiller arid was caught by the German barrage as it moved back."

"On the night of October l2th-l3th, 1918, two working parties were sent out from the 350th Infantry under command of Capt. Safford and Capt. House, respectively, their mission being to connect the advance line with the first German trench at Ammertzwiller. These two detachments were each to be protected by French covering detachments. These were provided by reconnaissance parties which included a number of officers and N. C. 0’s. It was reported that these covering parties were late in arriving and the reconnaissance parties were cut off by a Minenwerfer barrage in advance of our front lines. This was at 19 hours, at the same time our own barrage was laid down by the French Artillery in support.